Date Thesis Awarded
Bachelors of Science (BS)
Charles R. Johnson
Donald E. Campbell
Lawrence M. Leemis
A social welfare rule g selects a complete asymmetric binary relation on a set of alternatives A as a function of voter preferences over A. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem show that all social welfare rules fail to satisfy a small number of seemingly innocuous properties when voter preferences are unrestricted. In this paper, we propose several techniques for quantifying the degree of these failures for simple majority rule and Borda's rule. In addition, we develop a matricial framework for analyzing social welfare rules. We believe that the tools and methods proposed have significant potential in future analysis.
Merrill, Lauren Nicole, "A Survey of Social Choice Failures: Majority and Borda Rules" (2008). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 792.
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