Date Thesis Awarded

5-2008

Document Type

Honors Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelors of Science (BS)

Department

Mathematics

Advisor

Charles R. Johnson

Committee Member

Donald E. Campbell

Committee Member

Lawrence M. Leemis

Abstract

A social welfare rule g selects a complete asymmetric binary relation on a set of alternatives A as a function of voter preferences over A. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem show that all social welfare rules fail to satisfy a small number of seemingly innocuous properties when voter preferences are unrestricted. In this paper, we propose several techniques for quantifying the degree of these failures for simple majority rule and Borda's rule. In addition, we develop a matricial framework for analyzing social welfare rules. We believe that the tools and methods proposed have significant potential in future analysis.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Comments

Thesis is part of Honors ETD pilot project, 2008-2013. Migrated from Dspace in 2016.

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