Date Thesis Awarded
5-2008
Access Type
Honors Thesis -- Access Restricted On-Campus Only
Degree Name
Bachelors of Science (BS)
Department
Mathematics
Advisor
Charles R. Johnson
Committee Members
Donald E. Campbell
Lawrence M. Leemis
Abstract
A social welfare rule g selects a complete asymmetric binary relation on a set of alternatives A as a function of voter preferences over A. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem show that all social welfare rules fail to satisfy a small number of seemingly innocuous properties when voter preferences are unrestricted. In this paper, we propose several techniques for quantifying the degree of these failures for simple majority rule and Borda's rule. In addition, we develop a matricial framework for analyzing social welfare rules. We believe that the tools and methods proposed have significant potential in future analysis.
Recommended Citation
Merrill, Lauren Nicole, "A Survey of Social Choice Failures: Majority and Borda Rules" (2008). Undergraduate Honors Theses. William & Mary. Paper 792.
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/792
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Comments
Thesis is part of Honors ETD pilot project, 2008-2013. Migrated from Dspace in 2016.