Date Thesis Awarded

5-2009

Document Type

Honors Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelors of Arts (BA)

Department

Economics

Advisor

Arnab Basu

Committee Member

Tun-jen Cheng

Committee Member

David Feldman

Abstract

This thesis considers the possibility and implications of product dumping under a variety of different environments. The first cases we consider follow directly from the Brander-Krugman Reciprocal Dumping model first introduced to the literature in 1982. Following our analysis of these, we next analyze the Brander-Krugman model in the context of a sequential game. However, the most important finding from this analysis, in particular, is the paradox of a government's attempt at an information-coordinating trigger strategy. This finding has broad applications to current product-dumping policy since it serves to greatly enhance the welfare of the countries and industries involved.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Comments

Thesis is part of Honors ETD pilot project, 2008-2013. Migrated from Dspace in 2016.

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